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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
The state appeals from the district court's intermediate appellate decision 
that reversed the denial of Baker's motion to dismiss and ordered vacated the 
judgments entered upon the jury verdicts finding Baker guilty of 11 counts of 
violating a civil protection order. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
On March 4, 2009, an Ada County magistrate entered a civil protection 
order prohibiting Baker from having any contact, by telephone or otherwise, with 
his estranged wife, Robyn Shea, for a period of one year. (R., pp.17 -21, 59-62, 
214.) Between May 26, 2009, and September 17, 2009, Baker telephoned Ms. 
Shea on multiple occasions, each time leaving her a harassing voice message. 
(R., pp.13-14, 214; see also Defendant's Exhibit B1 (audio recording of voice 
messages).) Ms. Shea received 11 of the voice messages while she was in 
Kootenai County and one while she was in Ada County on August 24,2009. (R., 
p.214.) 
On September 10, 2009, the Boise City Attorney's Office filed a complaint 
charging Baker in relation to the August 24, 2009 voice message with one count 
of violating the civil protection order (the Ada County case). (R., p.214; 10/8/10 
Tr., p.31, L.20 - p.32, L.8; 11/5/10 Tr., p.43, Ls.13-24; Plaintiffs Exhibit 2.) On 
December 8, 2009, the Coeur d'Alene City Attorney's Office filed a complaint 
1 The exhibits cited herein were all admitted at the October 8, 2010 hearing on 
Baker's motion to dismiss. 
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charging Baker with 12 counts of violating the civil protection order, including by 
calling Ms. Shea on August 24,2009 (the Kootenai County case). (R., pp.22-24, 
214; 11/5/10 Tr., p.44, Ls.11-16.) 
Before Baker was arrested on, or apparently was even aware of, the 
Kootenai County charges, he and the Boise City Attorney's Office reached a plea 
agreement in the Ada County case. (R., pp.214-15; 11/5/10 Tr., p.43, L.16 -
p.44, L.22.) As recited by Baker's attorney at the February 17, 2010 change of 
plea hearing, the terms of the Ada County plea agreement were as follows: In 
exchange for Baker's plea of guilty to having violated the civil protection order by 
contacting Ms. Shea on August 24,2009, 
the state has agreed not to file any additional violations of this no 
contact order or protective order from this date past. Obviously, 
anything - any behavior - that occurs from this date forward, you 
know, he can still be charged with, but our agreement is essentially 
that the state will bring one charge today, he will admit that, plead 
guilty today and they will pursue no further charges from anything 
that's happened in the past from today's date. We do not have any 
specific agreements as to the recommendations. 
(Defendant's Exhibit A. 2) The Ada County magistrate accepted Baker's plea and 
proceeded to sentencing, at which time the prosecutor played for the magistrate 
a recording of both the August 24, 2009 voice message that was the basis of the 
Ada County charge, as well as several other voice messages that were the 
2 Defendant's Exhibit A is an audio recording of the February 17, 2010 plea and 
sentencing hearing in the Ada County case. There is no written transcript of that 
hearing and, as such, the quoted material herein reflects only what the 
undersigned believes to be an accurate representation of defense counsel's 
statements on the record at that proceeding. 
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subject of the pending Kootenai County case. 3 (Id.) Ultimately, the Ada County 
magistrate placed Baker on probation. (ld.) 
Approximately two months after Baker was sentenced in the Ada County 
case, he was arrested on the Kootenai County charges. (R., pp.26-27, 215; 
11/5/10 Tr., p.44, Ls.21-23.) Baker moved to dismiss the Kootenai County 
complaint, claiming double jeopardy in relation to the count charging him with 
having violated the civil protection order by calling Ms. Shea on August 24, 2009, 
and arguing that the prosecution of him in Kootenai County for any protection 
order violations alleged to have occurred before February 17, 2010, was barred 
by the Ada County plea agreement. (R., pp.45-46, 63-68, 215.) After a hearing, 
the magistrate dismissed Count VI of the complaint, finding the allegation therein 
identical to the Ada County charge to which Baker had already pled guilty and 
thus barred by double jeopardy. (R., pp.72, 74, 215; 11/5/10 Tr., p.45, Ls.12-
22.) The court denied Baker's motion to dismiss the remaining 11 counts, 
concluding that the Ada County plea agreement was not binding on the Coeur 
3 While Baker was apparently not aware of the Kootenai County charges when 
he entered his guilty plea in the Ada County case, there is some indication in the 
record that the Boise City Prosecutor's Office knew about the Kootenai County 
charges. (See 10/8/10 Tr., p.26, Ls.20-25, p.27, L.24 - p.28, L.1, p.31, Ls.11-16 
(Coeur d'Alene City Prosecutor representing that Boise City Attorney's Office 
was aware of Kootenai County charges no later than January 2010); Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 1 (January 11, 2010 letter from Boise City Attorney's Office requesting 
information from Coeur d'Alene City Attorney's Office regarding "any stalking, 
harassment, and/or protection order violations" committed by Baker "during 
2009"); R., p.14 (10/2/09 police report indicating Coeur d'Alene Police contacted 
Boise City Attorney's Office and left message for Deputy Boise City Prosecutor 
assigned to the Ada County case).) However, no reference to the pending 
Kootenai County charges was ever made by the prosecutor at the February 17, 
2010 change of plea hearing in the Ada County case. (See Defendant's Exhibit 
A.) 
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d'Alene City Attorney's Office and, accordingly, was not a bar to the Kootenai 
County prosecution. (R, p.74, 215; 11/5/10 Tr., p.45, L.24 - p.47, L.25, p.50, 
Ls.2-21.) 
Following a trial, a jury found Baker guilty of all 11 remaining counts in the 
Kootenai County case. (R., pp.98-108; see also R., pp.122-32 Oudgments 
entered upon jury verdicts).) Baker timely appealed to the district court (R., 
pp.134-41), arguing, inter alia, that the magistrate erred in denying his motion to 
dismiss all of the Kootenai County charges (R., pp.142-62, 188-98). The district 
court agreed with Baker and ordered his convictions vacated, ultimately 
concluding that the Coeur d'Alene City Prosecutor's Office was bound by the 
Ada County plea agreement and was therefore precluded from prosecuting 
Baker in Kootenai County for the 11 protection order violations Baker committed 
between May and September 2009. (R., pp.213-31.) The state timely appealed. 
(R., pp.234-37.) 
4 
ISSUE 
Did the district court err in concluding that the prosecution of Baker in 
Kootenai County was barred by the Ada County plea agreement? 
5 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred In Concluding That The Prosecution Of Baker In 
Kootenai County Was Barred By The Ada County Plea Agreement 
A. Introduction 
The district court ordered Baker's convictions vacated, concluding that the 
prosecution of Baker in Kootenai County for the 11 protection order violations he 
committed between May and September 2009 was barred by the Ada County 
plea agreement. The district court erred. The Coeur d'Alene City Attorney's 
Office (the prosecuting agency in the Kootenai County case) was not a party to 
the Ada County plea agreement, and the Boise City Prosecutor's Office (the 
prosecuting agency in the Ada County case) had neither actual nor apparent 
authority to bind the Coeur d'Alene City Attorney's Office in its plea negotiations. 
The district court's intermediate appellate decision that concluded otherwise 
should be reversed. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate 
appellate capacity, the reviewing court "directly review[s] the district court's 
decision to determine whether it correctly decided the issues presented to it on 
appeal." Borely v. Smith, 149 Idaho 171,176,233 P.3d 102, 107 (2010) (citing 
Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare v. Doe, 148 Idaho 124, 126, 219 P.3d 448, 
450 (2009); see also Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008)). 
The granting or denial of a motion to dismiss is generally reviewed for an 
abuse of discretion. State v. Card, 137 Idaho 182, 184-85,45 P.3d 838,840-41 
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(2002); State v. Dixon, 140 Idaho 301, 304, 92 P.3d 551, 554 (Ct. App. 2004); 
State v. Keetch, 134 Idaho 327, 329, 1 P.3d 828, 830 (Ct. App. 2000). 
"Whether a plea agreement has been breached is a question of law to be 
reviewed by this Court de novo, in accordance with contract law standards." 
State v. Jafek, 141 Idaho 71,73,106 P.3d 397, 399 (2005) (citing United States 
v. Bunner, 134 F.3d 1000,1003 (10th Cir. 1998)). 
C. The Boise City Prosecutor's Office Had Neither Contractual, Actual Nor 
Apparent Authority To Bind The Coeur d'Alene City Attorney's Office In 
The Plea Negotiations That Resolved The Ada County Case 
It is well settled that "when a plea rests in any significant degree on a 
promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the 
inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled." Santobello v. New 
York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971); State v. Peterson, 148 Idaho 593,595,226 P.3d 
535, 537 (2010) (quoting Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262). It is equally well settled 
that plea agreements are "contractual in nature" and, as such, "must be 
measured by contract law standards." State v. Cope, 142 Idaho 492, 495, 129 
P.3d 1241, 1244 (2006) (citing Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50,63,106 P.3d 376, 
389 (2004)). The burden of proving the existence of a contract, "including the 
existence of a mutual intention," is "on the party asserting it." Peterson, 148 
Idaho at 595, 226 P.3d at 537 (quoting Johnson v. Nasi, 309 P.2d 380, 382 
(Wash. 1957)); see also State v. Gomez, 153 Idaho 253, _, 281 P.3d 90, 94 
(2012) ("burden of proving the existence of a contract and the fact of its breach is 
upon the plaintiff') (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). If a plea 
agreement exists and the state breaches it, "the defendant is constitutionally 
7 
entitled to relief." State v. Lampien, 148 Idaho 367, 376, 223 P.3d 750, 759 
(2009) (citing State v. Jafek, 141 Idaho 71,74,106 P.3d 397, 400 (2005)). 
In this case there is no question that, while the Kootenai County charges 
that are the subject of this appeal were pending, Baker entered into an 
agreement with the Boise City Prosecutor's Office to resolve the Ada County 
case. Pursuant to the terms of that agreement, Baker pled guilty to violating the 
civil protection order by calling Ms. Shea on August 24, 2009, and the "state" 
agreed not to "file" or "pursue" any additional charges arising out of any 
violations of the order before February 17, 2010. (Defendant's Exhibit A.) It is 
undisputed that the Coeur d'Alene City Attorney's Office was not a party to the 
Ada County plea agreement, nor was the dismissal of the pending Kootenai 
County charges ever mentioned as a term of the Ada County agreement. In fact, 
Baker failed to present any evidence below that the Coeur d'Alene City 
Prosecutor's Office even knew about the Ada County agreement, much less that 
it assented to the dismissal of the Kootenai County charges as part of that 
agreement. Because the Coeur d'Alene City Prosecutor's Office was not a party 
to the Ada County plea agreement, it was not contractually bound by that 
agreement to dismiss the Kootenai County charges. 
The district court recognized, at least implicitly, that the Coeur d'Alene City 
Attorney's Office was not an actual party to the Ada County plea agreement. 
(See R., pp.218-24 (analyzing whether "plea agreement made by a prosecutor 
and the defendant in one county [can] bind a prosecutor from a different 
county").) It nevertheless held that the agreement was binding on the Coeur 
8 
d'Alene City Attorney's Office, and therefore required the dismissal of the already 
filed Kootenai County charges, for two reasons. First, the court held that 
because venue over the Kootenai County charges was proper in either Kootenai 
or Ada Counties,4 the Boise City Attorney's Office had actual authority to bind the 
Coeur d'Alene City Attorney's Office and prevent the prosecution of Baker in 
Kootenai County. (R., pp.217, 225-27,227 n.3.) Second, the court found that 
the use of the word "state" in the agreement was ambiguous and could have 
reasonably led Baker to believe that the agreement to not file or pursue any 
additional charges arising out of Baker's violations of the civil protection order 
before February 17, 2010 was binding on "all prosecutors in the State of Idaho." 
(R., pp.226-28.) 
Neither of the district court's stated bases for dismissing the Kootenai 
County charges withstand scrutiny. Absent any words or actions by the Coeur 
d'Alene City Attorney's Office indicating that it assented to the dismissal of the 
Kootenai County charges as part of the Ada County plea agreement, the Boise 
4 The district court's determination that venue over the Kootenai County charges 
was actually appropriate in either Kootenai or Ada Counties appears to be based 
on its belief that it was "undisputed that [Baker] was located in Ada County 
during the time the calls were made." (R., p.217; see also I.C. § 19-304(1) 
(when public offense is committed "in part in one (1) county and in part in 
another ... venue is in either county").) This was not a finding made by the 
magistrate in relation to Baker's motion to dismiss (see 11/5/10 Tr., pp.45-50), 
nor was any evidence presented in relation to the motion to dismiss that would 
have supported such a finding. Nevertheless, because, as set forth in greater 
detail herein, the Boise City Attorney's Office did not have authority to prevent 
the Coeur d'Alene City Attorney's Office from prosecuting the 11 protection order 
violations that indisputably occurred at least in part in Coeur d'Alene - the 
location where the victim received the harassing telephone messages - the 
district court's determination that venue was proper in either county, even if true, 
is ultimately irrelevant. 
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City Attorney's Office had no authority - actual or apparent - to contract on the 
Coeur d'Alene City Attorney's Office's behalf. Moreover, even assuming an 
ambiguity in the Ada County plea agreement, such ambiguity would only properly 
have afforded Baker relief from his guilty plea in the Ada County case; it does 
not compel dismissal of the Kootenai County charges, the disposition of which 
the Boise City Attorney's Office had no authority to negotiate. 
Idaho's appellate courts have never considered whether one prosecuting 
agency in the state can bind a separate prosecuting agency to a plea agreement 
absent the second agency's express consent.5 Applying agency analysis, other 
jurisdictions have concluded that, absent consent or a statutory provision 
authorizing the contracting prosecutor's office to bind other agencies, the 
promises made by to a defendant by one prosecuting agency are binding only 
with respect to that prosecutor's office, and not on all other prosecutors in the 
state. See Staten v. Neal, 880 F.2d 962 (ih Cir. 1989) (agreement of no 
prosecution by Fayette County prosecutor not binding on prosecutor in 
Champaign County where offense occurred); State v. Barnett, 707 N.E.2d 564 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (county prosecutor had no authority to waive prosecution 
for an offense committed outside his county); United States v. D'Amico, 734 
F.Supp.2d 321, 348 (S.D. N.Y. 2010) ("plea agreement binds only the office of 
5 In State v. Lampien, 148 Idaho 367, 377, 223 P.3d 750, 760 (2009), the Idaho 
Supreme Court noted "a split of authority on the issue of whether a law 
enforcement agency is bound by a prosecutor's plea agreement" (emphasis 
added), but declined to resolve the split based on its determination that the law 
enforcement officers in that case were acting in their individual capacities as 
victims, not as investigators on behalf of the state. 
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the United States Attorney for the district in which the plea is entered unless it 
affirmatively appears that the agreement contemplates a broader restriction ... " 
(internal quotations and citations omitted»; State v. Bryant, 42 P.3d 1278 (Wash. 
2002) (one county prosecutor may not bind another county prosecutor to an 
immunity agreement without the latter's knowledge and consent). 
The reasoning of Staten, supra, is instructive. Staten escaped from a 
correctional center in Champaign County, Illinois. Staten, 880 F.2d at 962. 
Several months later, he was arrested and charged with robbery in Iowa. kL at 
963. Before trial, Iowa prosecutors contacted the prosecutor in Fayette County, 
Illinois (where Staten had been imprisoned before his transfer to the Champaign 
County correctional facility), and asked him whether he would waive prosecution 
of the Illinois escape charge to facilitate Staten's guilty plea to the Iowa robbery 
charge. kL at 962-63. The Fayette County prosecutor agreed, and Staten pled 
guilty to robbery in Iowa. kL at 963. 
After Staten completed his sentence on the robbery charge, the 
Champaign County prosecutor, who had not been consulted by the prosecutors 
in either Fayette County or Iowa, charged Staten with escape. kL Staten was 
convicted and the Illinois appellate court affirmed, "holding that a state's attorney 
in one county could not bind a state's attorney in another county under Illinois 
law." kL Staten then filed a federal habeas petition, which was denied. kL 
On appeal from the denial of Staten's habeas petition, the Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals noted, as an initial matter, that (1) the Iowa prosecutor acted in 
good faith when he promised Staten that, in exchange for his plea to robbery in 
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Iowa, he would not be prosecuted for escape in Illinois; (2) the promise was not 
kept in Illinois; (3) ordinarily, Staten's remedy for any breach of the Iowa 
agreement would have been to challenge his Iowa conviction; and (4) Staten 
could not challenge his Iowa conviction because he completed his Iowa 
sentence before the Champaign County prosecutor charged him with escape "in 
arguable violation of the Iowa plea agreement." J.9..,. Given these "unique 
circumstances," the appellate court addressed the merits of Staten's challenge to 
his Illinois conviction, framing the issue before it as "whether the Due Process 
Clause prohibits a state's attorney in Illinois, whose jurisdiction included the 
county in which the crime was committed, from prosecuting a defendant when a 
state's attorney from another Illinois county promised the defendant that he 
would not be prosecuted." J.9..,. at 963-64. Applying agency principles the court 
ultimately found no due process violation, concluding that the Fayette County 
prosecutor had neither actual nor apparent authority to bind the Champaign 
County prosecutor in the plea agreement that resolved the Iowa case. J.9..,. at 
964-66. 
In determining that the Fayette County prosecutor had no actual authority 
to prevent the prosecution of Baker in Champaign County, the Seventh Circuit 
relied on an Illinois state statute that limited the duties of Illinois State's attorneys 
to the prosecution of "all actions, suits, indictments and prosecutions, civil and 
criminal, in the circuit court for his county, in which the people of the State or 
county may be concerned." J.9..,. (citing III.Rev.Stat. ch. 14, ~ 5(1) (1985)). The 
court also found relevant the Illinois statute that required prosecutions for 
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offenses committed by persons confined in a correctional facility to be had in "the 
circuit court of the county wherein such crime was committed." !9.. (citing 
III. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, ,-r 1003-6-5 (1985)) (emphasis omitted). The court reasoned 
that, taken together, these statutory provisions supported the state appellate 
court's determination that the Fayette County prosecutor had no actual "authority 
to promise not to prosecute an offense that occurred in Champaign County." .!.Q.". 
The Seventh Circuit also rejected Staten's argument that the Fayette 
County prosecutor, as an agent of the state, had either inherent or apparent 
authority to negotiate on Champaign County's behalf regarding the escape 
charge. .!.Q.". at 965-66. Regarding Staten's claim of inherent authority, the court 
reasoned: 
The doctrine of inherent agency authority presupposes that one 
party is an agent of another party, the principal, and that it is this 
agency relationship which causes the third party to assume that the 
words and actions of the agent are also those of the principal. See 
Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 8A, 161 comments a & b. 
Staten claims that the Fayette County State's Attorney was an 
agent of the State of Illinois. As we have already noted, this 
analysis is only partially correct because the State has invested the 
state's attorneys with agency authority only in their respective 
counties. State's attorneys are explicitly authorized by statute to 
prosecute actions in the circuit court of their respective counties. 
See III.Rev.Stat. ch. 14 ,-r 5(1) (1985). Their jurisdiction does not 
extend to other counties. The Fayette County State's Attorney had 
no actual authority from the State to prosecute actions outside of 
his county. Without actual authority to prosecute actions outside 
his county, the Fayette County State's Attorney could not have 
inherent authority to enter into a plea agreement regarding a 
violation that occurred outside his county. Inherent authority only 
extends to those actions which normally would be considered a 
part of the agent's actual responsibilities. 
Staten, 880 F.2d at 965-66. Similarly, the court found apparent authority lacking, 
explaining: 
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In order for there to be apparent authority, a party must have, 
through its words and actions, indicated to a third party that another 
party was empowered to act as its agent. See Restatement 
(Second) of Agency § 8. The State of Illinois did not represent that 
the Fayette County State's Attorney was its agent in counties 
outside the county in which he was elected. See III.Rev.Stat. ch. 
14,-r,-r 4,5 (1985). We presume that a resident of Illinois knows the 
content of its laws and therefore is bound by them .... The law as 
created by the State of Illinois did not imply that a state's attorney 
could bind the State in another state's attorney's jurisdiction when 
negotiating a plea agreement. 
Staten, 880 F.2d at 966. 
Finally, the Seventh Circuit found unpersuasive Staten's reliance on 
several federal cases involving promises by United States Attorneys that 
purported to bind other United States Attorneys in other districts. l!::L. The court 
reasoned that, unlike United States Attorneys who "work for, are accountable to, 
and can be controlled by one central authority - the Attorney General of the 
United States," State's attorneys in Illinois are not accountable to a single 
authority but, instead, work for their respective counties and, as such, do not 
speak for the entire state government. l!::L. 
Having concluded that the Fayette County prosecutor had neither actual, 
inherent or apparent authority to bind the Champaign County prosecutor from 
prosecuting a crime that occurred in Champaign County, the Seventh Circuit 
ultimately held that "[t]he law does not ... require or even permit reversal of 
Staten's [escape] conviction." l!::L. at 966. 
Relying on the reasoning of Staten, the Ohio Court of Appeals reached a 
similar conclusion in State v. Barnett, 707 N.E.2d 564 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998). 
Barnett pled guilty in Warren County to one count of gross sexual imposition 
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involving his stepdaughter. Barnett, 707 N.E.2d at 565. In exchange for 
Barnett's plea, the Warren County prosecutor agreed to dismiss two other 
charges and also agreed that no additional "charges of any kind, anywhere are 
going to [be] filed relating to these children, on anything that's happened to-
date." ~ After Barnett severed his Warren County sentence, he was indicted in 
Montgomery County on five counts of gross sexual imposition involving his 
daughter and stepdaughter. Id. at 566. The trial court granted Barnett's motion 
to dismiss, but the Ohio Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Warren 
County prosecutor had neither actual nor apparent authority to bind the 
Montgomery County prosecutor and prevent the prosecution of Baker for crimes 
he committed in Montgomery County. ~ at 570. 
In so holding, the court noted an Ohio statute that limits the scope of a 
prosecutor's duty to the prosecution of crimes "within the county." ~ at 570 
(citing Ohio R.C. 309.08(A)). While the court agreed with Barnett that "a county 
prosecutor is an agent of the state, [it] also agreed with the Staten court's 
recognition that the county prosecutor's agency authority extends to the county 
line when investigating and prosecuting crimes. Thus, the county prosecutor is 
an agent of the state with respect to crimes committed in his county." ~ The 
court therefore concluded that, as in Staten, the Warren County prosecutor did 
not have any actual authority to bind the Montgomery County prosecutor in its 
plea negotiations. Id. 
The court also concluded that, as in Staten, the Warren County 
prosecutor lacked apparent authority. ~ The court reasoned: U[T]he state of 
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Ohio did not represent that Warren County prosecutors were authorized to act as 
its agents and plea bargain with respect to offenses committed wholly outside 
Warren County. The laws of Ohio support no such inference." .!5i Finding "no 
Ohio statutory law or case law authorizing the Warren County Prosecutor's 
Office to prevent Barnett's prosecution in Montgomery County for sexual 
offenses he allegedly committed in Montgomery County," the appellate court 
reversed the trial court's order of dismissal and remanded the case for further 
proceedings . .!5i at 570-71. 
The reasoning of Staten and Barnett applies with equal force to the facts 
of this case and requires reversal of the district court's appellate decision. Baker 
was prosecuted by the Boise City Attorney's Office (acting in its capacity as the 
contract Meridian City prosecutor) for a civil protection order violation he 
committed in the City of Meridian. In resolving that case, the Boise City 
Attorney's Office promised Baker that, in exchange for his plea, the "state" would 
not "file" or "pursue" any additional charges for protection order violations 
committed by Baker before February 17, 2010. (Defendant's Exhibit A) The 
Boise City Attorney's Office, however, did not have actual authority to contract 
for any other prosecuting agency in the state. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 50-
208A(2), "a city attorney, his deputies, or contract counsel shall prosecute those 
violations of county or city ordinances, state traffic infractions, and state 
misdemeanors committed within the municipal limits." (Emphasis added). 
Like the statutes relied on in Staten and Burnett, this statute limits a city 
attorney's authority to the prosecution of only those crimes committed within its 
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specific municipality. Thus, as stated in Barnett, "the [city] prosecutor is an agent 
of the state with respect to crimes committed in his [city]." Barnett, 707 N.E.2d at 
570. Because the Boise City Attorney's Office's authority did not extend beyond 
municipal lines, it did not have actual authority to prevent the Coeur d'Alene City 
Attorney's Office from pursuing its prosecution of Baker for the 11 civil protection 
order violations that were committed in the city limits of Coeur d'Alene. 
Nor did the Boise City Attorney's Office have apparent authority to bind 
the Coeur d'Alene City Attorney's Office in the Ada County plea negotiations. As 
noted by the court in Staten, "[i]n order for there to be apparent authority, a party 
must have, through its words and actions, indicated to a third party that another 
party was empowered to act as its agent." Staten, 880 F.2d at 966 (citing 
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 8). The State of Idaho did not represent that 
the Boise City Attorney's Office was its agent in cities outside the cities in which it 
was appointed. To the contrary, as noted above, state law specifically limits the 
authority of city attorneys to the prosecution of offenses "committed within the 
municipal limits." I.C. § 50-208A(2). Because the laws of this state create no 
inference that a city attorney is cloaked with authority to bind the state in another 
city attorney's jurisdiction when negotiating a plea agreement, the Boise City 
Attorney's Office had no apparent authority to prevent the prosecution of Baker 
in any other municipality. 
Relying on State v. Peterson, 148 Idaho 593, 226 P.3d 535 (2010), the 
district court appears to have held that, even if the Boise City Attorney's Office 
did not have authority to negotiate on behalf of the Coeur d'Alene City Attorney's 
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Office, Baker is nevertheless entitled to relief from his Kootenai County 
convictions because "there was an ambiguity in the [Ada County plea 
agreement], specifically with respect to the extent of the power of the prosecuting 
attorney." (R., pp.225-28.) While the state agrees that any ambiguity in the plea 
agreement must be resolved in Baker's favor in the Ada County case, the 
wording of the plea agreement is irrelevant as it pertains to the authority of the 
Boise City Attorney's Office to actually prevent the prosecution by the Coeur 
d'Alene City Attorney's Office of the crimes Baker committed in Coeur d'Alene. 
Indeed, the court in Barnett, supra, rejected the proposition that an ambiguity in 
a plea agreement entered into by one county prosecutor could have the effect of 
binding another prosecuting agency without the latter prosecutor's consent: 
[E]ven if the Warren County plea agreement unambiguously 
purports to bind all Ohio prosecutors, as we believe it does, the 
agreement is ineffective in Montgomery County. One county's 
prosecutor cannot prevent indictment in a second county, absent 
the consent of the second county's prosecutor, when the two 
prosecutions do not involve allied offenses of similar import. [6] 
Thus, ambiguous or not, the Warren County plea agreement 
remains unenforceable with respect to separate crimes occurring in 
Montgomery County. 
Barnett, 707 N.E.2d at 571 (emphasis original) (internal citations omitted). 
Likewise in this case, regardless of whether the Ada County plea agreement is 
ambiguous, the Boise City Attorney's Office did not have authority to negotiate 
on behalf of the Coeur d'Alene City Attorney's Office and, as such, the Ada 
County plea agreement is unenforceable with respect to the separate crimes 
6 Under Ohio law, "allied offenses of similar import" are essentially those 
offenses whose multiple prosecution would be barred by double jeopardy. 
Barnett, 707 N.E.2d at 566-67. 
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Baker committed in the Kootenai County case. If Baker believed, based upon 
the wording of the agreement with Boise City, that he could not be prosecuted by 
any other prosecuting agency for crimes arising out of his protection order 
violations, his remedy was withdrawal of his plea in the Ada County case, not 
dismissal of the Kootenai County charges. The district court's appellate opinion 
to the contrary should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's 
intermediate appellate decision that reversed the magistrate's order denying 
Baker's motion to dismiss. 
DATED this 31st day of December 2012. 
I A. FLEMING 
Deputy Attorney Genera 
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